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how recently enacted "victims
rights" statutes have influenced the
practice of criminal justice around
the country. Since 1980, some 40
states have adopted such statutes.
The project will entail extensive
telephone surveys, as well as personal interviews with prosecutors,
judges, defense attorneys and other
criminal justice practitioners. Contact Victim/Witness Project Director Susan Hillenbrand in the
Section's staff offices at 202/3311160.
For Juvenile Court Judges
The Section's Juvenile Justice Project has published a new monograph entitled An Emerging Judicial
Role in Family Court. The publication provides practical guidance to
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the juvenile court judge who, unlike
colleagues in adult criminal or civil
court, must be well-versed in child
development, family dynamics,
children's needs, and dispositional
alternatives for youths. It is based
largely on a unique experimental
training and consultation project
operated in the Family Division of
the District of Columbia Superior
Court. Copies are available from
ABA Order Fulfillment, 750 N. Lake
Shore Drive, Chicago, Illinois 60611.
The order number is 509-0026, and
the cost is $5 to Section members,
prepaid.

Pleadings for Use in Juvenile Court
Proceedings. It is a companion volume to Checklists for Use in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings, and is designed to assist lawyers new to delinquency practice or those
representing juvenile clients on an
infrequent basis. A selection of sample pleadings frequently used in juvenile court is included. Copies are
available from ABA Order Fulfillment, 750 N. Lake Shore Drive,
Chicago, Illinois 60611. The order
number is 509-0027, and the cost is
$5 to Section members, prepaid.

Sample Pleadings to Use in
Juvenile Court
Another new Juvenile Justice Project publication is entitled Sample

Marcia Christensen is the assistant
staff director of the American Bar Association's Section of Criminal Justice.

LEGAL }reedman
By Monroe H. Freedman

ADVANCES IN
PROSECUTORS'
ETHICS
Virtually all authorities agree that the
public prosecutor should be held to
different standards than defense attorneys. Since those dual standards
derive from the significantly different role and functions served by
each, the prosecutor's obligations
are not, as is sometimes said,
"higher" than the defense lawyer's-they are simply different.
The differences in role and function are clear. The defense lawyer
represents individuals whose rights
are guaranteed by the Constitution.
The accused, not the state, has a
Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel, a Fifth
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Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, and a First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
The prosecutor, on the other hand,
acts in the name of the government,
with all its majesty and power. Conduct that may be tolerable on the
part of private individuals may be
reprehensible when done under
color of law, on behalf of the nation
or state. The prosecutor also has
unique powers of discretion, requiring special ethical rules to guard
against abuse.
Despite a professional consensus
that the prosecutor has special ethical obligations, there is relatively little scholarly work on prosecutors' ethical responsibilities. (A
notable exception is Alschuler,
"Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial judges," 50 Tex. L.

Rev. 629 (1972).) Although the Code
of Professional Responsibility (1970)
and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (1983) both recognize the
general proposition that prosecutors must be subject to distinctive
rules, neither code follows through
by providing specific rules where
they are most needed.
The inclusion of several important new provisions for prosecutors
in the District of Columbia Bar's revisions of the Model Rules is, therefore, a major advance. In fact, the
thoroughgoing revision of the Model
Rules by a special committee of the
D.C. Bar is the best and most important effort to codify rules of
professional responsibility. The
committee, chaired by Robert E.
Jordan Ill, the president-elect of the
bar, devoted two years of intensive
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study, debate, and extensive redrafting to the ABA's Model Rules.
After careful review, the Board of
Governors has recommended
adoption of the committee's proposal by the D.C. Court of Appeals.
The new prosecutorial provisions
originated with a subcommittee of
seven members. Significantly, four
members of the subcommittee were
representatives of the United States
Attorney's Office and the Justice
Department (under Attorney General Meese), and another member
was a former federal prosecutor. The
subcommittee unanimously supported all of the provisions adopted
by the Jordan Committee except
one (which is not among the three
discussed here).
Selective prosecution
It is sometimes said that the Model
Rules were inspired by the role of
lawyers (the bad ones, that is) in
Watergate. Perhaps the most egregious abuse that surfaced in Watergate was the Enemies List, a list of
people who were to be investigated
and prosecuted by the government
because Richard Nixon viewed
them as personal or political enemies. The Enemies List, like a similar
list and the Get Hoffa Squad of the
Kennedy administration, was an extreme example of what Justice Robert Jackson had called "The most
dangerous power of the prosecutor:" the discretionary power to target someone for investigation and
prosecution for the crime of being
"personally obnoxious to or in the
way of the prosecutor."
It is ironic, then, that the ABA's
Model Rules have no provision forbidding the prosecutorial use of an
Enemies List. Rule 3.8(a) says only
that a prosecutor shall refrain from
"prosecuting a charge" that the
prosecutor knows "is not supported
by probable cause." This language
does not limit targeting someone for
investigation for improper reasons.
Further, it is virtually useless as an
ethical limitation on bad faith prosecutions, because a determined
prosecutor, with the resources and
power of the government, should be

T16

able to meet the minimal requirement of probable cause against anyone for some offense.
Note too that selective prosecution is not proscribed by the Model
Rules. Illustrative is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1986), where an
ordinance made it unlawful to
maintain a laundry in a wooden
building without obtaining a license. The record showed that virtually all applications filed by
Chinese were denied, while virtually all applications by nonChinese were granted. Thus, the
prosecutions of Yick Wo and others
were the result of invidious discrimination. Those prosecutions were
wrong, therefore, despite the fact
that Yick Wo had in fact committed
the offense with which he was
charged.
Model Rule 3.8(a) is similar to DR
7-103(A) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the ABA
Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function 3-3.9(a). The key
phrase "unprofessional conduct"
(that is, conduct that could result in
disciplinary action) is used in Standard 3-3.9(a) only with regard to instituting or maintaining criminal
charges when "it is known that the
charges are not supported by probable cause." Beyond that, the prosecutor is urged, but not required, to
meet
a
higher
primafacie-case standard. Also, standard
3-3.9(c) urges but does not require
the prosecutor to "give no weight
to.. .personal or political advantages
or disadvantages...." This is a tiger
that is not only toothless but lame
(it omits racist motivation, for example).
In contrast, the D.C. Bar's subcommittee on prosecutors' ethics
unanimously proposed the following rules, which were then unanimously adopted by the Jordan
Committee and (with amendments
of form) unanimously adopted by
the D.C. Bar's Board of Governors.
Rule 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR
The prosecutor in a criminal case
shall not:

(a) In exercising discretion to investigate or to prosecute, improperly favor or invidiously discriminate against any person;
(b) File in court or maintain a
charge that the prosecutor knows
is not supported by probable
cause; [or]
(c) Prosecute to trial a charge that
the prosecutor knows is not supported by evidence sufficient to
establish a prima facie showing of
guilt....
The D.C. Bar proposal has a threetier standard for prosecutorial discretion: at the investigation stage
(and thereafter) the prosecutor must
not invidiously discriminate; at the
filing stage (and thereafter) the prosecutor must meet the standard of
probable cause; and at the trial stage
the prosecutor must meet the
standard of a prima facie case. Note,
though, that the test is subjective
(what the prosecutor "knows"); if a
judge grants a motion to dismiss,
therefore, the prosecutor is not automatically guilty of unethical conduct.

Pretrial publicity
Another area in which the Model
Rules, the Code, and the Standards
are inadequate is pretrial publicity.
The accused has a First Amendment
right to freedom of speech, and will
probably never need it more than
after an indictment has been published. The prosecutor as an agent
of the government has no right of
free speech, but is privileged to
publish, in an indictment, allegations of felonious conduct which, in
any other context, would be libelous per se. This is an area where the
different roles and functions of
prosecutor and defense lawyer
clearly call for different rules.
In some jurisdictions prosecutors
have purposefully heightened the
publicity occasioned by an indictment by holding press conferences
and making sensational allegations.
This action does not violate the
Code or the Model Rules because
DR 7-107(C)(8) and (9) and MR
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3.6(c)(2) permit publicity regarding
information in a public record. (The
ABA Standards adopt the Code provisions by reference.) Thus, by creating a "public record" (for example,
by filing a "speaking indictment") a
prosecutor whose desire for publicity outweighs his or her sense of
fairness is virtually unrestricted in
calling press conferences to generate the most damaging television
and press publicity about an accused.
At the same time, the Code and
Model Rules severely restrict the
ability of the defense attorney to respond. For example, under DR 7107(C)(1 1) the defense lawyer is
permitted to say only that "the accused denies the charges made
against him." See also DR 7-107(B)
and MR 3.6(b).
Ordinarily, prosecutorial publicity is viewed with regard to its effect
in prejudicing the trial. As recognized in the Comment to the D.C.
Bar proposal, however, the accused
is in effect punished without due
process when the prosecutor engages in extrajudicial comment that
"serves unnecessarily to heighten
public condemnation of the accused ... before the criminal process
has taken its course."
The Code and the Model Rules,
therefore, apply a dual standard to
prosecution and defense counsel
that stands upside-down the defendant's right of free speech and the
prosecutor's obligation not to punish the defendant without due
process of law. Accordingly, the
D.C. subcommittee on prosecutors'
ethics unanimously proposed a dual
standard that would limit pretrial
publicity by a prosecutor while providing room for the accused's freedom of speech. That proposal was
unanimously approved by the Jordan Committee, and (with amendments that did not change the
substance) unanimously adopted by
the D.C. Bar's Board of Governors.
The key provisions are:

case shall not:...
(f) Except for such statements as
are necessary to inform the public of the nature of the prosecutor's action, make extrajudicial
comments which serve to
heighten condemnation of the
accused without a legitimate law
enforcement purpose.
The Comment explains what is
"necessary to inform the public of
the nature of the prosecutor's action" and what is "a legitimate law
enforcement purpose." The prose
cutor may inform the public of
whether an official investigation has
ended and who participated in it,
and may respond to inquiries to
"clarify ... technicalities of the in-

dictment, the status of the matter,
or the legal procedures that will follow." Also, if the defense opens the
door by alleging unprofessional or
unlawful conduct by the prosecutor's office, the prosecutor may,
"insofar as necessary," answer the
charges. On the other hand, the
prosecutor should "use special
care" to avoid publicity that would
unnecessarily subject the accused
to public condemnation "such as
through televised press conferences."
The rule governing defense counsel and all other lawyers is MR 3.6:
RULE 3.6 TRIAL PUBLICITY
A lawyer engaged in a case
being tried to ajury shall not make
an extrajudicial statement that a
reasonable person would expect
to be disseminated by means of
mass public communication if the
lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the statement
will create a serious and imminent
threat to the impartiality of the
jury. (Emphasis added)
The Comment makes clear that "this
Rule applies only to extrajudicial
statements made after jury selection
has commenced."
Grand jury procedures

RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR
The prosecutor in a criminal
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Another important innovation that
originated with a unanimous recommendation of the D.C. Bar's sub-

committee
on
prosecutors'
responsibilities relates to the grand
jury. It reads:
RULE 3.8 SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PROSECUTOR
The prosecutor in a criminal case
shall not:...
(h) In presenting a case to a
grand jury, intentionally interfere
with the independence of the
grand jury, preempt a function of
the grand jury, abuse the processes of the grand jury, or fail to
bring to the attention of the grand
jury material facts tending substantially to negate the existence
of probable cause....
This provision recognizes that the
grand jury's procedures are essentially ex parte. Counsel cannot accompany a suspect before a grand
jury, present exculpatory evidence,
or make arguments on the suspect's
behalf. Also, the prosecutor not only
presents the government's case to
the grand jury as an advocate does,
but advises the grand jury much as
a judge instructs a petit jury. The
prosecutor's role before the grand
jury is sometimes described, therefore, as quasijudicial.
The grand jury is in theory an independent body of citizens. Scholarly commentators have noted,
though, that prosecutors have at
times imposed their will upon grand
juries, either to indict or not. That
may be done by taking improper
advantage of the prosecutor's
unique opportunities of ex parte
persuasion or of ex parte presentation of evidence. Some prosecutors
have also issued grand jury subpoenas without obtaining the consent of the grand juries.
The subcommittee on prosecutors' responsibilities, the Jordan
Committee, and the D.C. Bar's
Board of Governors concluded
without a single dissent that those
potential prosecutorial abuses
should be specifically addressed in
a comprehensive code of lawyers'
conduct.
I would recommend that bar
groups in other jurisdictions review
these and the other proposed rules
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